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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SISCO HILTE AND ZURICH AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Case No. 870592-CA
vs.
LESTER WAYNE SMITH and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

(Case Priority No. 6)

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS LESTER WAYNE SMITH
and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Was the Industrial Commission arbitrary and capricious in
awarding benefits L. Wayne Smith following the lifting of a
steel plate weighing at least 50 lbs. with an immediate onset of
pain.
Jurisdictional Statement
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 35-1-83 (Supp. 1986).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASE
The procedural portion of the case is governed by Utah Code
Annotated

§ 35-1-84

and

§35-1-85

(Supp. 1986)

(Addendum A)

Substantively, the case is governed by Utah Code Annotated § 35-

1-45

(Supp. 1986)

(Addendum B) as interpreted by

Allen v.

Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) (Addendum C).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
Respondent, L. Wayne Smith claimed and was awarded benefits

by the Industrial Commission.
B.

Court of Proceedings and Disposition bv the Industrial
Commission;
1.

Lester Wayne Smith filed an Application for Hearing

before the Industrial Commission on August 26, 1986, as a result
of an accident on March 25, 1986. (R. at 4)
2.

The Application

Appellants

had

denied

for Hearing was filed because the

responsibility

for medical

treatment,

payment of temporary total disability compensation and permanent
partial disability compensation to Respondent. (R. at 4)
3.

The Appellants continue to deny that Smith suffered a

compensable industrial accident. (R. at 7)
4.

A Hearing was held

on December

Respondent Smith presented testimony.

4, 1986 at which

No fact witnesses were

called by Appellants. (R 9-45)
5.

After the hearing the matter was referred to a medical

panel. (R. at 273-278)

The medical panel determined that there

was a causal connection between the applicants low back problems
and the industrial accident of March 25, 1986. They further
2

decided that the industrial injury aggravated a pre-existing
condition. (R. at 280-286)
6.

Following the decision by the Utah Supreme Court in

Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d

15 (Utah 1986) the

Administrative Law Judge allowed the parties to fully brief the
causation issue as it related to the fact of the case. (R. at
257, 258-261, 262-264 and 265-266)
7.

The Administrative Law Judge then issued her Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which she found that
there was an industrial accident, that applicant had met the
burden of legal causation and medical causation as required by
Allen, supra. (R. at 290-296) (See Addendum D)
8.

A Motion for Review was filed by Appellants challenging

the Administrative Law Judge's Findings.

(R. at

297-298 and

300-301)
9.

The

entire

Industrial

Commission

upheld

the

Administrative Law Judge's Findings that an industrial accident
occurred and that respondent has meet the tests set forth in
Allen, supra.
10.

(R. at 305-307) (See Addendum E)

A Petition for Review has been filed with the Utah

Court of Appeals seeking review of the Industrial Commission's
award of benefits.
C.

(R. at 308-309)

Statement of Facts
3

1.

Wayne Smith on March 25, 1986, was moving a stack of

steel plate.
2.

The steel plate was all 3/8 of an inch thick and varied

in size from 8 to 12 feet long with a width of from 12 to 14
inches. (R. at 14)

Each sheet weighed 50 to 80 lbs. He had

moved 2 or 3 sheets. (Record at 15)
3.

He bent over to pick up the next plate of steel and was

holding it with his left hand on the bottom and right hand on
the top while bent at the back.

As he picked up the sheet from

10" off the ground to waist height he felt a snap in his back
and

a sharp pain go down his right leg.

least 50 lbs.
4.
who

(R. at 15 and 16)

The accident was immediately reported to Smith's boss

kept

Smith

in

the

(approximately 2 hours)
attention.
5.

That sheet weighed at

office

the

remainder

of

the

day

also suggested that Smith seek medical

(R. at 15 and 18).

When applicant got home the pain had become worse.

The

pain was is his back just above his waist and down his right
leg. (R. at 19)
6.

The next morning applicant went to see Dr. Kenneth G.

Hansen, D.C., who treated him with chiropractic manipulations
for approximately seven weeks, then referred him to Allen T.
Hunstock, M.D. on May 9, 1986. (R. at 22 and 232)
4

7.

On May 28, 1986, Dr. Hunstock performed a right L/5

laminotomy with an L5-S1 diskectomy to repair a herniated L5-S1
disk.

(R. at 174-175)
8.

Although, at the time of the hearing, L. Wayne Smith

did not recall pre-existing back problems, (R. at 33-36) the
medical records of Dr. Mendenhall

demonstrate a prior back

injury for which Mr. Smith was hospitalized from April 10, 1980
through April 12, of 1980.

No surgery was performed and he was

discharged without medications. (R. at 92-11P)
9.

Smith continued treating with Dr. John P. Mendenhall,

M. D. through June 5, 1980, at which point the doctor noted
"Patient's

muscle

tone

remarkably improved.

now

is near

normal.

Symptoms

are

Straight leg raising is normal". (R. at

220-221)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission's determination that Wayne Smith
is entitled to workers compensation benefits is neither contrary
to law or contrary to the evidence presented at the hearing.
There is substantial evidence to support the decision of both
the Administrative Law Judge and Industrial Commission.
The

finding

is consistent with recognized

case law as

lifting long, thin steel plate weighing at least 50 lbs. is
unusual and extraordinary exertion sufficient to meet the first
5

prong of the test adopted in

Allen v. Industrial Commission.

729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). The items lifted, the manner in which
they were lifted and the weight of the steel bands are in no way
similar to any risks faced in ordinary non-employment life.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS FINDINGS MUST STAND
BECAUSE THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
AND ARE NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS
The standard of review for cases filed in the Industrial
Commission before January 1, 1988, allows a reviewing Court to
set aside the Commission award only after finding that either
the act was beyond the Commissions authority or was unsupported
by the actual findings.
The Administrative

Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-84 (1974).

Law Judge and Industrial Commission were

aware of the Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986) when this case was decided.

The Administrative Law Judge

and Commission applied the facts as presented at the hearing to
the standards set forth in Allen and determined that Smith had
established that the legal cause of his injury was the lifting
of steel bars on March 25, 1986.

Disturbing their findings in

this case would be inappropriate.
The Commissions findings should be evaluated in the light
most favorable to such findings and should not be disturbed
6

if

there is evidence of any substance to support the finding.
Savage v. Industrial Commission. 565 P.2d 782, 783 (Utah 1977)
and Griffiths v. Industrial Commission. 82 Utah Adv.Rep.51 (Ct.
App. May

18, 1988).

A

reviewing

Court

must

affirm the

Commissions findings unless they are
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary
and capricious when they are contrary to the evidence or
without any reasonable basis in the evidence Rushton v.
Gelco Express. 732 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 1986) quoted in
American Roofing Company v. Industrial Commission. 80
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Ct. App. April 13, 1988)
The record contains ample evidence to support the Commissions
decision.

For that reason, the Commissions award should be

affirmed.
POINT II
RESPONDENT L. WAYNE SMITH WAS INJURED BY AN
ACCIDENT WHILE PERFORMING A TASK WITH A RISK
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN EVERYDAY LIFE.
An injured worker who seeks to obtain workers compensation
benefits must prove, pursuant to § 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated
(1987) that he was injured "by an accident arising out or in the
course of his employment". That statue has been interpreted by
the Utah Supreme Court in Allenf

supra, to require first a

showing that an accident has occurred and a causal connection
between the injury and the employment duties.
standard has both a legal and medical counterpart.
7

The causation

In this case, the medical prong of the causal connection
test has been met by applicant's treating doctors and by the
medical panel. (R. at 280-286, 232-239 and 243-247)
raise no issue as to medical causation.

Appellants

Further, there appears

to be no question but that he was injured "by accident."

The

principle issue presented by Plaintiff's Appellants is whether
the Respondent L. Wayne Smith satisfied the "legal" causation
tests of Allen. supra.
A.

Smith's injury was caused by the lifting incident at
work.

There is no question or controversy surrounding Smith's
assertion that he was injured when lifting the steel plate.

He

testified that he felt a pop and had pain associated with the
lifting the plate.
panel

His treating doctors as well as the medical

found that there was a causal connection between the

industrial injury and his low back problems.
Law

Judge

and

Industrial

Commission

found

The Administrative
that

connection

appropriate.
No contradictory evidence has been presented by Appellants
to support a claim that L. Wayne Smith's disk herniation and
requiring surgery on any occasion other than the date of the
industrial accident identified as to time and place has having
occurred on March 25, 1986.

Unquestionably, he did have a

8

"unusual event" immediately surrounding lifting one of the steel
plates.
B.

Smiths exertion at the time he was injured was
extraordinary and unusual when compared to nonemplovment activities of his peers.

Wayne Smith, on the day he was injured, was involved in
moving steel plates 8 to 12 feet long, 12 to 14 inches wide and
3/8 of an inch thick from the top of a stack containing 30 to 40
plates.
to

pick

He had moved 2 or 3 such plates and was just beginning
up

the

3rd

or

4th

plate

when

his

back

snapped.

Applicant testified:
Q What were you doing actually as your back
snapped? Do you understand my question?
A I was bent over picking up the plate of steel.
Q
Had you lifted it some distance from the other
pieces of steel?
A Yes.
Q And how were you holding it?
A In both of my hands. I had one hand on the
bottom of it and one hand on the top of the plate of
steel.
Q And which hand was on the bottom?
A My left.
Q Was the right hand on the top to steady it?
A Yes.
Q How were you? Were you bent at the knee,
bent at the back?
A Bent at the back.
Q How far off the ground was this particular piece of
steel?
A Well, it was sitting on—there were probably 30 or
40 plates of steel, and it was on the top.
Q So would that make it two feet, three feet off the
ground?
A Oh, about ten inches, probably.
Q And how far had you lifted it before you felt your
back snap or pop?
9

A About a foot and a half.
ME. CHAI: A foot and a half off the ground, or a foot
and a half from the top of the stack?
THE WITNESS: A foot and a half from the top of the
stack.
Respondent

(Record at 16-17)
submits that carrying

objects such as those

carried by Smith in the manner they were carried is not an
exertion of everyday life.

Applicant is unable to imagine any

activities undertaken by "men and women in the later part of the
twentieth century" Allen, supra at 26 which bear any similarity
to the incident described by Smith*

The manner in which Smith

moved the plate from one area to another using one hand on top
and one hand on the bottom of a 14 foot length could not be
characterized as anything but awkward.

The dimensions of the

plate itself makes it very different from items regularly or
routinely carried by the general public.

Coupling the size of

the plate with the density and weight of steel, supports no
finding other than that lifting and moving such steel would
involve unusual exertion.
The Court of Appeals recently applied the Allen standard to
another lifting incident.

In American Roofing, supra George

Ray Green suffered a back injury while attempting to unload a
thirty

pound,

bucket

out

of his

truck.

In affirming

the

Commission's Finding of compensability, the Court stated:
"...[E]vidence of the weight, with the manner in which
10

Green lifted the bucket and the fact that the bucket
snagged, combined to characterize Green's actions as
unusual or extraordinary under the Allen definition.
American Roofing has failed to establish that such a
finding is arbitrary and capricious.
American
Roofing, supra at 17.
The decision

in American

Roofing, supra.

gives further

support to the Commission's finding of compensability in this
case.

The weight of the object lifted is not the only criteria

to be used.

It should coupled with the manner of lifting and

the other circumstance surrounding the injury.
It should further be noted that at no point in the cases
decided by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals applying
the Allen standard, has a weight limit been set.

Applicant

asserts that few persons, and certainly not the majority of the
population, routinely lift fifty pound, objects.
may

Although there

occasionally be instances where people lift fifty pounds

under ordinary non-industrial circumstances, the lifting of a 12
ft. by 14 in. piece of metal with one hand under the metal to
lift it and the other on top for stability is not ordinary.

It

is in no way similar to or comparable with lifting baggage,
taking garbage cans to the street, lifting children, groceries
or tires.
carried.

Once children reach 20 to 25 lbs. they are rarely
Garbage cans or tires are normally lifted with both

hands. It is ludicrous to suggest the average person totes

11

groceries or any other items weighing fifty pounds on a regular
basis.
Clearly,

the

incident

described

by

applicant

involved

lifting an item of unusual dimensions weighing more

than the

average person carries.

The exertion in no way compares with

those

average

exertions

of

the

man

or women.

Thus, the

Industrial Commission's decision is supported by the law and
evidence and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission correctly found that Respondent,
L. Wayne

Smith, was

injured by an accident

at work.

The

Commission was also correct in finding that at the time of his
injury, Mr. Smith was involved in a task which required exertion
substantially greater than that to which persons are ordinarily
exposed.
Because

the

Industrial

Commission's

ruling

is

fairly

supported by the evidence in the case and is neither arbitrary
or capricious, it should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £_
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day of June, 1988.
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ADDENDUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-84

A-l

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-85

A-2

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45

B-l

Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15

C-l

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

E-l

Order Denying Motion For Review

D-l

ADDENDUM "h"

ADDENDUM "K"
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-84 (Supp. 1965)
FURNISHING AND CERTIFYING PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSCRIPT
TO SUPREME COURT - POWER OF COURT TO AFFIRM OR SET ASIDE
AWARD - GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE.
Upon filing of the action for review the Court shall
direct the Commission to furnish and certify to the
Supreme Court, within twenty days# all proceedings and the
transcript of evidence taken in the case, and the matter
shall be determined upon the record of the Commission
as certified by it. Upon such review the Court may affirm
or set aside such award, but only upon the following
grounds:
(1) That the Commission acted without or in excess of
its powers;
(2)
That the findings of fact do not support the
award.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-85 (Supp. 1953)
DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW - FILING - CONCLUSIVENESS ON QUESTIONS OF FACT REVIEW - COURT JUDGMENT
After each formal hearing, it shall be the duty of the
Commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
in writing and file the same with its secretary.
The
findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of
fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not be subject
to review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate
facts and the findings and conclusions of the Commission.
The Commission and every party to the action or proceeding
before the Commission shall have the right to appear in the
review proceeding. Upon the hearing the Court shall enter
judgment either affirming or setting aside the award.

ADDENDUM A-1,2

ADDENDUM " B "

ADDENDUM "K»

Utah Code Ann,

§ 35-1-45 (Supp. 1986) :

COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS TO BE PAID,
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who
is injured, and the dependents of every such employee who
is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or
death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount
of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter.
The
responsibility for compensation and payment of medical,
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.

ADDEMDUM B-l

ADDENDUM

"C

ALLEN v IM)1 STR1AL COM N

Utah
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Cite a» 729 FJL! I* (Lt*K ! * *

Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. Board of
Review, Jer Ken. Inc.. State Insurance
Fund and Second Injun Fund, Defend
anu
No. 20026
Supreme Coun of Utah
Nov. 14, 198C
Worker, who sustained lower back in
juries while stacking milk crates containing
four to six gallons of milk, sought review
of an order of the Industrial Commission,
denying his motion for review of an order
of an administrative law judge denying his
workers compensation clam. The Supreme Coun, Durham, J., held that: (1)
finding that worker s injury was not "by
accident* was not based on the evidence
and. thus, was erroneous, but (2* worker's
claim would be remanded for further fac;
finding as to whetner action of worker,
who had previous back problems, in lifting
several piles of milK crates exceeded exer
tion whicn average person typically under
took in nonempioyment life and whetner
medically demonstrable causal link existed
between worker's lifting and injur} to his
back
Vacated and remanded
Hall, CJ.. filed opinion concurring ir
pan and dissenting in pan, with Siewan.
Associate CJ., joining in the dissent
Stewan, Associate CJ.. dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Evidence *=>lt
Supreme Coun took judicial notice that
liquid mil*, weighs about the same as liquid
water or approximately eight and one-third
pounds per gallon: thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 88 pound? without the
container* and crate, and six gallons of
milk weigh about 50 pounds without con
tamers and crate

2. Worker*' Compensation c=»515
For purposes of workers compens^
tion. key requirement of an "accident* is
tna: occurrence t* unanticipated ur
planned, anc unintended where either
cause of injury or result of exemor is
different from wnat would normally oe e>
pectea to occur, occurrence is unplanned
unforeseen, and umntendec and, thus, by
"accident'; clarifying Carixng v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2c
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-4:
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions
3. Workers* Compensation *=>515
For purposes of workers' compensation, proof of unusual event may be helpful
in determining causa) connection between
injury and employment; however, proof of
unusual event is not required as an element
of requirement that injury be "by accident " U.C.A.1953, 85-1-45
4. Workers' Compensation «»515
An "accident/' for purposes of requirement that injury be "by accident" to be
compensable under Workers' Compensator
Act. is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either tne cause or thf
result of an injur}-; abandoning Redmar.
Warehousing
Corp
i
Industrial
Coram n. 22 Utah 2d 39b. 454 P.2d 283.
Church of Jesus Chris! of Latter-Dap
Saints t Industrial Commission, 590
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmers Grain Cooperativi t Mason, 606 ?M ZSVtUtah);
Sabo's Elec Sen. if Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah). Billings Computer Corp. i\ Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45
5. Workers* Compensation *»56S
Key question in workers' compensation
case in determining causation is whether,
given worker's body and workers exertion,
tne exertion in fact contributed to the injury U.C.A.1953. 35-1-45
6. Workers* Compensation C»552. 568
Only those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required
by employment increases risk of injury

ADDENDUM C-l

If

Utar

72* PACIFIC REPORTER 2d SERIES

which worker normally face? in his everyday life is compensable under Worker/
Compensation Aci: injuries which coinc
dentally occur at work because preexisting
condition results in symptoms which appealdurmp work hours witnout any enhancement from the work piace are not compel
sabit. U.C.A.1953. 35-1-45
7. Workers' Compensation ^=^597
For purposes of workers compensa
tion. two-pan causation test, requinng consideration of legal cause and medical caust
of injury, is required in determining whetr
er causal connection exists between injun
and workers employment; abandoning
Billings Computer Corp. x. Tarango, 674
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Sen. t.
Sabo. 642 P.2d 722 (Utah): Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah;.
IGA Food Fair t. Martin. 584 P.2d 82>
(Utah). Nuzum i. Roosendahl Construe
txon and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144
(Utah j. Jones r. California
Packing
Corp.. 123 Utah 612. 244 P.2d 640; Robertson v. Industrial Commission. 109 Utah
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Assn v. Industrial Commis
sion. 104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser
Steel Corp v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 88^
(Utah): Schmidt t Industrial Commit
sion. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah); Residential and
Commercial Construction Co. i. Industrial Commission 529 P.2d 427 (Utah)
Pouvn i. Industrial
Commission, 1^
Utah 2d 140. 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Indus
trial Commission. 17 Utah 2G 141, 405
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. t. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45
8. W orkers* Compensation *=>553
Where claimant suffers from preexisting condition which contributes to injury,
unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove "legal causation." for purposes of two-pan causation test for determining whether causa! connection exists
between claimant s injury and claimant's
employment: where there is no preexisting
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is

sufficient to prove legal causation
1953. 3 r - l - 4 :

U.C.A

9. Workers' Compensation *=»59?
For purposes of legal causation ele
men: of two-pan test for determining
whether causal connection exists betweer
claimants injury and claimants employment, precipitating exeruon must be com
pared with usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life of people in
general, not nonempioyment life of the particular claimant in question U.C.A.1953.
35-1-45
10. Workers* Compensation G=>597
Under medical causation portion of
two-pan test for determining whether
causal connection exists between claimants
injury* and claimant s employment, claimant
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that stress, strain, or exertion re
quired by his or her occupation led to resulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45
11. Workers* Compensation e»1390
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness
of employ e e s exertions may be relevant to
medical conclusion of causal connection between claimant's injury and claimant s employment U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
12. Workers* Compensation *=»1533
Finding that claimant's lower back injury was not "by accident' as claimant was
stacking milk crates was not based on the
evidence and. thus, was erroneous; claimant expenenced unexpected and unanticipated injury to his back as beJifted crate
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant
had not complained of pain or limitations at
his job, and no evidence indicated that injury was predictable or developed gradually
as with occupational disease or progressive
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 8CK)-45
13. Workers* Compensation *=»1950
Compensation claim of worker, who
had preexisting back problems and sustained lower back injuries while stacking
crates containing four to six gallons of
milk, was remanded for further fact finding on issue as to whether moving and
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lifunp several pile? of crates m'eighmg '&•
to 50 pounds in confmea area of cooie*
exceeded exeruon average person typical^
undertook in nonempiovmen! hit and
whether there was medically demonstrable
causal link between worker s action in lif:
ing milK crates and injury to his back anc
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "aros<
out of or in tne course of employment'
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-4:
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Set
ond Injun
Fred R. Silvester. James R. Black, Salt
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund
DURHAM. Justice
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review
from the Industrial Commission's denial of
his motion for review of an administrative
law judge order denying him compensatioi
for a back injury sustained at work for
the reasons stated beiou, we reverse and
remand
IIJ On November 23. 1982. the claim
am, aged 36. was employed as night marage r of Kent's Foods Tne claimant test!
fled to the following version of events at a
hearing before an administrative lav
judge Tne claimant was working in a
confined cooler in the store stacking crates
containing four to six gallons * of milk
from the floor onto a cooler shelf While
lifting one crate to about chest level, he
suddenly felt a Bharj pain m his lower
back He immediately set down the crate
and asked another employee to continue
stocking the shelves Tnt claimant com
pleted the one-half hour remaining in his
shift doing desk work That night the pair,
increased, and by morning his left leg feh
numb Four or five days later, he saw Dr.
Ivan Wright about his back problem In tia! doctor visits during December were
followed through with the prescribed treat -

men: of bea rest and medicatior. A myeigram finally revealeo a herniated disc anc.
tne claimant spent ten days in traction 1:
the hospital m eariy January He did no:
return to won.
Tne claimant also testified he had a hisvry of prior back injuries- including a fa!
fron; L telephoiv pon at age fourteer.
which required him to wear a back brace
for several montns. a back injury in 1977
while lifung sand bags for the Logar,
School District and another fall whiit
working for that employer when he slipped
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his
coccyx. None of the pnor injunes resulted
in prolonged absences from work
The testimony from other sources varied
slightly from the report given by the claiman: Tne employer s report of injury de
scribes the accident as "picking up freight
and stocking 11 on shelves, lifung boxes
and stacking them from truck " No specific event was mentioned in the employer s
report Tne medical records of treating
physicians described the claimant's prev;
ous injunes. but omitted any reference to a
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannar..
who examined the claimant on December
31, 1982, wrote "He does not rememoer
any distinct episoae as having precipitated
his current problem, however.' And in a
letter from Dr. bryner to Dr. Wright dated
January 13. 198o. the claimant's history
was related as follows "About six weeks
ago. however, he was lifung matenal a:
work, and recalls no .specific injury or
•tress but developed discomfon in his left
prom area which ultimately extended into
his big tot '
Tne administrauve law judge found that
the claimant s injury to his back on November 2c. 1982 was not "an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of
employment" It is apparent that the ad
tmnistrauve law judge, using a specific episode analysis, concluded there was no "accident** because there was no identifiable

t. Vvr lake judicial notice that liquid milk weighabout the same as hquic water or approximate))
8/3 pounds pci gallon Tnus four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds witDom the con
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even; that caused tne injury and becaus*
lifting the crates of mil* was a routine anc
commonplace exeruon expected of the jot
The administrative la* judge analogizec
the facts of this case to Farmers Gran
Cooperauvi v. Mason. 606 P.2d 237 (TJtar
1980K where a gradually developed baa
injury was held to bt no: compensable
where the condition worsened without the
intervention of any external occurrence or
trauma
Tne Bole issue on appeal is whether the
claimant, who had suffered preexisting
back problems and was injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for hb
job, was injured "by accident arising out of
or in the course of employment' as required by the Workers' Compensation Act.
U.C.A.. 1953. § 3^-1-45 (Supp.1986). That
Act, in pertinent pan, provides
Even* empioyet . . . who is injured . . .
by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment . . . shall be
paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury....
Id This statute creates two prerequisites
for a finding of a compensable injury
First, the injury must be "by accident *
Second, the language "arising out of or u.
tne course of employment' requires tha:
there be a causai connecuon between the
injury and tne employment Sec Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory t. Keller, 657
P.2d 1367. 1370 (Utah, 1983, Prior dec*
sions by this Court have often failed u>
distinguish tne analysis of tn* accident
question from tne discussion of causation
elements 2 As a result, this Court and the
Commission are faced with confusing and
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea*
2. Vve note that mam of our pnor opinions so
intermingled the causation and accident analyses ina' i< is impossible to segregate them and
determine the basis lor the Courts decision
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Eiec. Sen. \.
Sabo, 642 ?2d 722 (Uian 1982;. mixes the acci
dent and causation elements in the following
language "it appears to be mere coincidence
that defendant s miun . occurred at work
Defendant bears the burden of showing other
wist Proof of the causa! relationship of duties
of employment to unexpected injury is simph
lacking —
(T)ne Commission s conclusion
thai an accident occurred is without am sub

son we now undertake a fresh look at the
poncy and historical background of the
worken compensation statute in an attempt to provide a clear and workable ruk
for future application by tne Commission
1
The term "by accident' is not defined in
the worxers compensation statutes Tne
most frequently referenced authority for
the definition of "by accident" is the case
of Carlinp i. Industrial Commission. 16
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). where the
term was defined as follows
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in tne usual course of events
(TJhis is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility' that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, h
climax might be reached in such manner
as to properly fall within the definition of
an accident as just stated above. However, such an occurrence must be disunguished from gradually developing cond>tions which are classified as occupational
diseases
Id. at 261-62. 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones
l California Packing Corp.. 121 Utah
612. 616, 244 P.2d 640. 642 (1952). and
Purity Biscuit Co. t. Industrial Commission. 115 Utah 1. 201 P.2d 961 (1949);
Some confusion has developed as to whether "by acciaent' requires" proof of an unusual event This issue" frequently arises
when tne employee suffers an internal failure 8 brought about by exertions in the
stannve suppon in the record." Id at 726 (foot
notes omitted) See also Church of Jesus Chns:
of Latter-UQX Saints \. Industrial Commh. 590
?2d 32fc. 32^-30 (Utah 1979;. hntar i. Industrial Comm n. 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 V26 414 (1963)
For an example of an opinion which does tepa
rate the accident and causation analysis, aee
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Industrial Comm n. 590 V2d 326. 330-31 (Utah
1979) (Wilksns. J., dissenting).
3. An "interna! failure" refers to a category of
iniunes tha: arise h-om general organ or struc
tural failure brought about b> an exertion in tht
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workplace It is clear, however thai oir
cases have defined "by accident' to incluat
internal failures resulting from both usua
and unusuai exeruons Sec Schmid: x
Industrial Commission. 617 PJ&d 693, 69f
fljtah 1980
This Court first discussed the tern, "DV
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. t. Industrt
al Commission. 60 Utah 14. 200 P. 27>
(1922). where an accident was aaid to be
"something out of the ordinary. une>
pected. and definitely located as to time
and place/' 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281
This definition was used to distinguish injuries which occurred gradually and were
covered under statutory provisions for oc
cupational disease Id The Court in Tin
tic Milling also acknowledged that where
the claimant suffers an internal failure the
"unexpected result' rule of the seminal
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903]
A.C. 443. 72 LJ.K. 789. 6 W.C.C. 1. is
appropriate The Court in Tintic Milling
observed
"Since the case of Fenton t. Thorley.
nothing more is required than that the
harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected
It is enough
that the causes, themselves known and
usual, should produce a result which or
a particular occasion is neither designed
nor expected Tne test as to whether an
injury is unexpected, ana so. if received
on a single occasion, occurs 'by acciaent
is that the sufferer die no; intend or
expect that injury would on that paracu
lar occasion result from what he was
doing '
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohleii, A Problem in Tht Drafting of Workmen '$ Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev
826. 340 (1912) (emphasis added)) Accordingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previous respiratory problems were aggravated by entering a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable accident
workplace Internal failure claims evaluated b\
this Court include hean attacks hernias and
back injuries See generally, Note. Schmidt i
industrial Commission and Injury Compcnsabih

After Tintic Milling the Court term*.*
raniy rejected the "unexpected result' def
initios of Fenioii x Thorlei in interna
failure cases on the ground that the def ID
UOJ of "by accident' requireo an unusua
occurrence or exertion In Bamberger ?
Industrial Commission. 66 Utah 203, 24^
P. 1103 (1925). the Court denieo compensa
tioii to a worKer wno unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while manually unloading a raiiroaa car of coai on the ground
that no overexertion occurred during the
work 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104
Tnat decision was apparently overruled,
however, when the Court embraced the
"unexpected result" rule and awarded com
pensation to an employee who Buffered a
heart attack after overexertions while routinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir
Hammona i. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Moffat. J., concurring) Hammond was followed in Columbia Steel Co. i. Industrial
Commission 92 Utah 72. 66 P.2d 124
(1937). where a unanimous Court held that
tne employee, who had suffered a ruptured
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over
rough ground, suffered an injury "by accr
dent' since tne result wa»c "an unusual.
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occurrence* and definite as to time and place.
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And. in Thomas
D. Dec Memorial Hospital Ass n t. Industrial Commission. 104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d
233 (1943). tne Court sustained an award of
benefits to a claimant who had suffered
from hean disease and experienced a heart
attack shortly after moving 62 boxes
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of
fire ciay—work that was unusually heavy
and greatly in excess of his ordinary
duties Tne Court pointed out. in dicta,
that the English common law would have
awaroed compensation even if the exertions were ordinary and usually required as
part of the jot. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138
P.2d at 235-3^ Quoting from the Bohlen
article, supra, the Court observed:
fv under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A
Just Result or Jus: Anothr "Living Corpse"/,
1981 Utah LRev. 393
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"fN)othinf more is required than tha:
the harm that the plaintiff has sustainec
shall be unexpected
Tne element of
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'accident' is sufficiently supplied . . . if.
though the act K usual and the cond
tions normal, it causes a harm unfore
seen by him who suffers it'
104 Utah at 70. 138 P.2d at 23T
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co t
Industrial Commumon, 115 Utah 1. 201
P.2d 961 (1949). this Court explicitly
adopted the English rule for the definition
of an accident and awarded benefits to a
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back
while stepping on the brake pedal of a
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activi
ty. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70.
After summarizing early Utah eases interpreting "by accident" the Court concluded
that ''since 1922 this court has uniformly
held that an unexpected internal failure
meets the requirements of ["by accident"]
4. The holding of Punt? Biscuit was questioned
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm n, 19 Utah 2d 373
431 P.2d 798 (1967). where the opinion erroneously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never beer
cited by this or any other court to support tht
Uw of that case ' 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 ?2d a
799 In faa, by 1967 Punry Biscuit had beer
relied upon in decisions from the courts of mnt
other state*. Alabama Textiles Proas. Corp \
Grantham, 263 Ala 179. 183-*4. 82 So.2d 2(K
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exeruor
unnecessary to support conclusion that claiman:
suffered injury bv accident;, Bryant Stave 6.
heading Co. v. White. 227 Ark 147, 151-52. 29t
SMJZd 436. 439-40 (1956) (Punry Biscuit citec
as stating majority DOSXUOD that usual exeruor
causing an interna] failure may be by accident;
Argonaut ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm n.
231 Ca.LApp.2d 111. 41 CalJCptr. 628. 635 (1964)
(reiving upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit)
Sptvey v. Banaglw PruxtCo., 138 So2d 308. 31*
(Fia.1962) (back herniation from rupture of m
tervenebrai disc satisfies statutory requiremen:
of suddenness;. Roman v. Minneapolis Si /?>.,
268 Minn. 367, 380. 129 NW.2d 550. 559 (1964;
(calls Punry Biscuit *a weh-considered work
mens compensation cast" thai supported mr.
award wnere mam factors led to the disability)
Murph\ \. Anaconda Cc 133 Mom. 198. 208.
321 ?26 1094. 1100 (1958) (quoting favorabh
the reliance on Punry Ikscuit in Bryant Stave
227 Ar* at 151-52, 296 S.W2d at 439-40, and
holding that a usuai exertion may lead to a
compensable injury where the causal relation
ship is established;, Neman v. Ford Motor Co..
10 KJ. 325. 327-28. 9) A2d 569, 570 (1952) (Pu

and the legislature by failing to amend hac
acquiesced in tnat construction ' 115 Utah
at 16. 201 P.2d at 96c.
Tnfr holding of Purity Biscuit also
squarely embraced the concept that an or
dinars or usual exertion that results m ar:
unexpected injury is compensable. See l l o
Utah at 18-19. 201 P. at 86&-70. After
carefully considering the legislative purpose of tne workers' compensation statute.
prior precedent, and public policy, the
Court rejected the requirement that proof
of an unusual activity or exertion be a
required element of the "by accident*' definition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at
967-70 The Court concluded that "there
is nothing in the statute which would justify a holding that an injury is compensable
where overexertion is shown but is not
compensable where only ordinary exertion
is shown, provided that in both cases it is
shown that the exertion causes the injur y " 4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970.
riry Biscuit cited in support of rule that interna!
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an
"injury bv accident"); Olson v. Suite Indus:
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407. 416-17, 352 ?2d
1096, 1101 (1960) (OConnell. J., specially con
curnng) (dissent to Punry Biscuit quoted; Coo
per v. Vinaneru 73 S.D. 41*. 424. 43 N.W.2d 747.
750-51 (1950) (Punry Biscuit cued as an exam
pit of the divergent viewpoints for defining a
compensable accident
In addition, the decision in Punry Biscuit was
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases.
See Jones \ California Packing Co., 121 Utah
612 244 V2d 640. 642, Carlmg i. Industrial
Commission. 16 Utah 2d 260. 399 ?2d 202,
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d
140, 427 ?2d 740 Desfrhe* This support for the
decision in Punry Biscuit, the Court in Melier.
concluded without further discussion that 1t)he
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a health)
reappraisemen: * 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 T2d at
BOO 7 wo years later in kedman Warehousing
Corp v. Industrial Comm n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
T2d 263 (1969;, the Court again questioned the
Punry Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis
tha* concluded Turin emoys the unique and
doubtful distinction of beuif a living corpse'
22 Utah 2c at 403. 454 V2d at 2&t After
considering those cases from Utah and other
jurisdictions that have relied on Punty Biscui:.
we nou canno: agree that it was a "living
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 ?2d 693. 695 (Utah
1980)
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous casehave held that an internal injury may b*
compensable if n results from either a
usua) or unusual exertion in the course of
employment Sec. e.g.. Champion horra
Builden x. Industrial Commission. 70;
P.2d 30G (Utah 1985) (perforated uicer
caused by lifting an unusually heavy
beam). Pittsburg Testing Laboratories \
Keller. 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen anc
unanticipated heart attack resulting from
exeruon whiie inspecting roof atructure)
Kaiser Steel Corp r. Monfredu 631 P.2d
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from
shoveling coal compensable despite usual
ness of activity and presence of preexisting
conditions): Painter Motor t. Ostler. 617
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting
from moving heavy boxes and installing
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980>
(back injury resulting from carrying steel
plates compensable despite prior history of
back disorders and ordinary activity;
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper. 61 o
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack result
ing from exertion while rushing to drowning accident;: JGA Food Fan r. Martin
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack re
suiting from heavy lifting), hiuzum v. Roo
sendahl Construction d* Mining Corp..
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver
suffered heart attack after repeatediy
climbing long steps;; Residential & Commercial Construction Co t. Industrial
Commission. 52^ P.2d 427 (Utah 1974)
(back injury resulting from moving lumber;. Powers i. Industrial
Commission
19 Utah 2d 140. 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart
distress occurring over a period of several
montns- compensable despite preexisting
conditions): baker v. Industrial Commission. 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965^
(back injury* resulting from filing papers in
lower drawer compensable).
Despite the strong precedential support
for applying the 'unexpected result' rule
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases,
a separate line of opposing authonn has
developed which requires overexertion or
an unusual event tt» prove an injury oc
curred "by accident" Typically, these

case*- oenieo compensator< because the
claimants ordinary work duties precipitai
ed the injury Consequently, there were TK
events or exertion? tnat were unusual or
extraordinary to qualify a* "oy accident'
Set. e.g.. Bilimgs Computer Corp v. Jar
ango. 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation for knee injury denied wnere circum
stances precipitating the injury were con
monplace anc usual) Sabo's Electronic
Service t. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982.
(back injury- from loading box of twelve
radios into van not compensable): Farrrt
er's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant
with preexisting condition resulting from
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensable Bince the activity was not unusual or
unexpected): Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission 590 P.2d 326 (Utah 1979) (back injury
suffered by janitor upon standing up no;
compensable without evidence that activities were unusual); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Commission 22 Utah
2d 396. 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury
precipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not compensable without proof of
an unusual event) These cases will not be
collectively referred to as the Redman line
of cases
12) We are now convinced that the Redman line of cases has misconstrued the
historical and logical definition of "by accident " Tne Redman line of cases relied on
the following abridged version of the defi
nition of an acciaent found ir. Carling x
Industrial Commission "[Accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally bt expected to occur m the usua!
course of events" 16 Utah at 261, 39^
P.2d at 20o (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted)
In Redman, the highlighted
phrase was interpreted tc require an unusual event before there can be an accident This interpretation misconstrues the
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent
with the English definition of "by accident"
used by this Court since 1922 The key
requirement of an accident under the Car
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/trap decision as wel a* prior decision*
was that tne occurrence be unanticipated
unplanned ana umniendec The highhgm
ed phrase emphasized that where eitner tn<
cause of the injury or tne result of ar
exertion was different from what woulc
normally be expecteo to occur, the occur
rence was unplanned, unforeseen. unin
tended and tnerefore "DV acciden:*
Policy considerations also militate in fa
vor of rejecting the notion that the pnrase
"by accident' requires an unusual even:
There is nothing in the term "accident'
that suggests that only that which is un
usual is accidental. Sec Robertson v. Industrial Commission. 109 Utah at 33. 40
163 P.2d at 335. 338 (Wade, J., concurring;
Wolfe. J., dissenting! An accident does
not occur simply because a worker is injured during an unusual activin*. This argument is illustrated by Professor Laraoi>
in his treatise on workmen's compensation
with the following example
If an employee intentionally and knowingly undertakes to lift an unusual load,
the cause (i.e.. the lifting) is no more
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a
normal load Or if a gardener deliberately continues to mow the lawn in the ran.
a passerby observing him would not say
that he was undergoing an accident
merely because it * unusual to mov
lawns in tne rain
Larson, Workmen's Compensation $ 38 62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted i
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusua
distinction as being unworkable in practice
Realistically, it is impossible to determine
what are the usual and norma! require
ments of a job. People work in good
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well
as light ones, and work for long hours as
wel! as short ones None of these activities may be unusual or unexpected. Id.
§ 88.63 at 7-164 to -16L
The unworkability of the usual-unusual
€vent requirement is further evidenced by
comparing seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court Compare Kaiser
Steel t. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back injury to miner with previous back problems

helo to be a compensable accident despiu
beinf caused by snoveling coal in the usual
course- of employment), with Farmer*
Gram Cooperative t. Mason. 606 P.2d 237
(no accident wnere worker witn previous
back problems sustained back injury while
delivering 100-pound bags of whey;, compare Baker i. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 141. 405 P.2d 613 (compensable
accident for back injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer; with Billings
Computer Corp. t. Tarango. 674 P.2d 104
mo accident where worker sustained knee
injury resulting from bending to pick up
small parts)
13,4] We bebeve that the Courts real
concern in the Redman line of cases was
the presence or absence of proof of causation to support an award of compensation.
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints. 590 P.2d at 332 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed
in the next section, the Conn has developed
two parallel lines of authority on the causation issue, one of which requires an unusual event in order to meet the statutory
causation requirement Although proof of
an unusual event may be helpful in determining causation, it is no; required as an
element of "oy accident' in section 35-145 "[Tjne basic and indispensable ingredient of acciden: is unexpectedness"
Schmidt 617 P.2o at 696 (Wilkins. J., concurring » (quoting IB Larson. Workmen'$
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We therefore reaffirm those cases, which hold that
an accioent is an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or
the result of an injury. We thus necessarily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in
the Redman line of cases which predicates
the "accident" determination upon the occurrence of an unusual even;
II
The second element of a compensable
accident requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the worker s
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing
Laboratory t. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370
(Utah 1983) In workers' compensation
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cases involving internal failures, tne Ke>
issue is usually one of causation. Ordmar
h. causation is proved by tne producuor
and interpretation of medical evidence e
ther alone or together witn other evidenct
See Keller. 657 P.2c a; 13GT. 1370
Schmidt i. Industrial Commission. 61T
P.2d 693. 695 (Utah 1980) because of the
difficulties of diagnos* of internal failures
and because of tne possibility that a preexisting condition may have contributed u
the injury, special causation rules have
been developed for internal failure cases
See Larson, supra. § 38.81, at 7-269, Purity Biscuit Co i. Industrial Commu
sion. 115 Utah 1. 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71
(Wolfe. J., concurring specially)
This Court initially responded to the
problem of causauon in internal failure
cases by suggesting that the Commission
use a clear and convincing evidence standard when an internal failure was caused
by an exeroon in tne workplace.5 Se(
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass n
t. Industrial Commission. 104 Utah 61.
74. 138 P.2d 233. 238 (1943) The clear and
convincing evidence standard was rejected
however, in Lipman i. Industrial Commission. 592 P.2d 61C. 618 (Utah 1979;
with the rationale that such a standard
would make workers compensation benefits nearly impossible to recover where the
deceased suffered froze a preexisting cond>
tion Accordingly, the standard to prove
causa! connection is preponderance of the
evidence Id
Tne second method that has been used to
ensure causal connection in internal failure
cases is to require proof that an unusual
even; or activity precipitated the injury.
Presumably, this requirement was used to
prevent compensating a person predisposed
to internal failure where the preexisting
condition contributed more u> the injury
than his usual work activity. Tne following internal failure cases illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activity is
necessan to prove causation. Billings
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is
still used where the employee cufiers from a
preexisting condition Set Mann v. City o*

Cojrivuter Con r Taranpo 674 P.2d 10;
lOf^OT (Utah 1983). Sabo's Electronic Sc>
incr v. Sabo. 642 P.2d 722. 726 n 12 (Utar
1982): Cnurch of Jesus Christ of Latter,
bav Saint* x Industrial Commission*
590 P.2d 328. 329 (Utah 1979; 1GA Fooc
Fair t. Martin. 584 P.2d 82b. 821J (Utar
1978; Suzum i. koosendeh! Construe
tion & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144. 114f
(Utah 1977). Jones i California Packing
Corp.. 121 Utah 612. 244 P.2d 640 (1952)
Robertson r. Industrial Commission, 109
Utah 25. 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D
Dee Memorial hospital Assn v. Industrial Commission. 104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d at
23^; sec Schmidt. 617 P.2d at 697-99
(Crockett. J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 23839 (Utah 1980); Mellen i\ Industrial Commission. 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798.
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit 115 Utah at 30,
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting)
Defendants argue that any rule that
awards compensation based on usual exertion will open the floodgates for payment
of benefits for all internal injuries that
coincidentally occur at work. Tney claim
that the unusual exertion requirement is
necessan to prevent tne employer from
becoming a general insurer. Tney argue
that without the unusual exertion rule, employment opportunities for persons with a
history or indication of physical disability
or handicap will be reduced
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual exertion* rule, the claimant urges us
to follow a separate hitet>f authority that
awards compensation for injuries that occur during usual and ordinary workplace
activin. Tfiese cases typically award compensation where the claimant was engaged
in a workplace activity and where there is
adequate evidence of medical causation
Sec, e.g.. Kaiser Steel Corp. t. Monfredi.
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for com
pensation affirmed for a coal miner's back
injury despite absence of unusual incident);
Schmidt t. Industrial Commission. 617
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for
Ornate. 211 Neb 583, 592. 319 K.W^d 454. 45*
(1982;
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If then is some personal causal contr.
bution in the form of a [preexisting coi
ditionj. tne employment contributor
must take the form of an exertion grea*.
er tnan that of nonempioyment lift
If tnere is no personal causai contritetion. thai is. if tnere is no pnor weaKnes.^
or disease, any exertion connected witr
the employment and causally connected
with the (injury) as a matter of medical
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal tes;
of causatior
Id Tnus. where the claimant suffers from
a preexisting condition which contributes to
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary e>
ertion is required to prove legal causatior
Wnere there is no preejosting condition, a
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.*

r. Aatwna! Gypsun, Co.. 34£ So.2d 497
499 (Ala Civ.App. 1977; (employment rist
must i* " a danger or risk materially u
excess of tnat to which people not so employeo are exposed... '' Quoting iron
City of Tuscaloosa t. Howard. 55 Ala.Ap^
701. 70;>-0C, 318 So.2d 729. 732 (1975))
but sec Market Foods Distributors. Inc. i
Lcvenson. 383 So.2d 12i>. 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
App.1980/ (subjective test "the employ
ment must involve an exertion greater than
that normally performed by the employee
during his non-employment life"). Tnus.
the precipitating exertion must be com
pared with the usua) wear and tear and
exertions of nonempioyment life, not the
nonempioyment life of the particular worker

19) We also accept Larsons suggestion
that the comparison between the usual and
unusual exertion be defined according to ar.
objective standard "Note that the comparison is not with this employee's usua!
exertion in his employment but with the
exertions of normal nonempioyment life of
this or any other person '* Larson, supra
§ 88.83(b). at 7-279 (emphasis in original/
Sec also Johns-Manvillc Products x. fa
dustnal Commission. 78 IU.2d 171, 17fe. 3;
lll.Dec. 540. 544. 399 N.E2d 606, 610 (1979
(compensation denied where tne risk of the
employment activity "is DO greater thar.
that to which he would have been exposed
had he not been so employed*'), Strickland

We believe an objective standard of comparison wili provide a more consistent and
predictable standard for the Commission
and this Court to follow. In evaluating
typical nonempioyment activity, the focus
is on what typical nonempioyment activities
are generally expected of people in today's
society, not what this particular claimant is
accustomed to doing. Typical activities
ana exertions expected of men and women
in the latter part of the 20th century, for
exampie. include taking full garbage cans
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage
for travel changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small chUd to chest height,
and climbing tne stairs in buildings By

S. Larson highlights the difference between the
unusual-usuai exertion lesi with the rule wr
tooa\ adopt with the following examples of e>
ire me cases in the bean attack area
Suppose X s job involves frequent lifting of
200-pound bags, and one such 20u-pound lih
medicaliv produces a hean attaci. Under the
old unusuai-exertion rule tnere would be no
compensation regardless of previous hean
condition Under tnt suggested rule there
would be compensation, even in the presence
of a history of hean diseast. because peopit
general)) do not lift 200-pounc weights as &
pan of nonemplovment lot and therefore
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ord»
nan wear and tear of life
Suppose Y s job involves no lifting Suppose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job
and suppose there is medical testimony tha:
this lih caused his hean attack Under the
old tesi. exclusive)) concerned with the com

panson between this employee's usual exertions and the precipiiaiing exertion, there
would bt compensation. Under the suggested
rule tne result would depend on whether
there was a persona) causal element in the
form of a previously weakened bean If
there was noi, compensation would be award
ed. since the employment contributed some
thing and tne employee s persona) life nothing
to the cause of the coliapst If there was (a
previous)) weakened heart], compensation
would be denied in spite of the medical causa1
contribution because legally the persona!
causal contribution was substantial, while the
employment added nothing to the usual wear
and tear of life—which certainly includes lift
ing objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders
Larson suprL. § 38.83. at 7-280-81 (footnote
omitted;
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sufficient causal connection between UH
disability and the working conditions Tnf
causauon requirement makes it necessan
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coir
cidentaliy occur at work because a preexist
ing condition results in symptoms which
appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, and (b)
those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by the em
ployment increases the risk of injury which
the worker normally faces in his everyday
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co..
444 A.2d 329, 837 (Me.1982) Only the
latter type of injury is compensable under
U.C.A., 1953, $ 35-1-45. There is no fixed
formula by which the causation issue may
be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each case

Larson, suprc
caused this [injury]"
§ 3fc.83ta>. at 7-276 to -27T

[7] Professor Larson has suggested a
two-part causation test which is consistent
with the purpose of our workers' compensation laws and helpful in determining causation We therefore adopt that test. Larson suggests that compensable injuries can
best be identified by first considering the
legal cause of the injury and then its medV
cal cause Larson, supra, { 38.83(a), at
7-27o "Under the legal test, the law must
define what kind of exertion satisfies the
test of * arising out of the employment . . .
(then) the doctors must say whether the
exertion (having been held legally stiff*
cient u> support compensation t in fact

\%) 1 Legal Cause—Whether an inju
ry arose out of or in the course of employ
inent is difficult to determine where the
employee brings to the workplace a person
al element of risk such as a preexisting
condition. Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, be or she is not du*
qualified from obtaining compensation
Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease
by an industrial accident is compensable
'" Powers t\ Industrial Commxstion. 19 Utah 2d 140. 143-44, 427 P.2d 740,
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the
legal causation requirement, a claimant
with a preexisting condition must show
that the employment contributed some
thing substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of
his condition This additional element of
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by
an exertion greater than that undertaken in
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion
serves to offset the preexisting condiuon of
the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather
than exertions at work Larson, supra,
§ 88.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized
how the legal cause rule would work in
practice as follows:

7. Cases from other jurisdiction* which have ac
cepted the dual-causation standard augpested b>
Larson include Market hoods Lhstrwi. inc \
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.DisLCXApp.1980'
(claimant wirn preexisting spina] disease denied
compensation wnert injury could have beer
tnggereo ai any ume during norma] movement
ano exertion m work not greater than typical
nonempiovmen: exertion;, Ouuiry v. SUne In
dus Potmen, Inc.. 41* So.2d 626 (La. 1982*
(claimant grantee compensation where injurs
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater
than that tn evervda\ noneroplovment life;
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 >L2d 329 (Mi
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition
swarded compensation for back injury resulting
from fall from his stoo) at work because of
increased risk of falling where employees
moved around him at work); Barren v. Herbert
Engi. ^c, 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977; (daiman<
with preexisting back condition denied compel/

sation for injury resulting from working at nor
mal pan since there was no work-related en
hancemem of personaJ nsk). Mann \ City of
Omaha. 211 Neb 583. 319 N Vs^d 454 (1982)
(policeman with history of heart disease award
ec compensation for heart attack at borne
where claimant s physician testified that attack
was caused by stress of police work rather than
persona! risk factors). Sehens v. Alien Prods
Cc. 206 Neb 50t. 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980
(claimant with preexisting bean problems de
Died compensation for bean attack suffered
while unloading 28-pound case* from truck
trailer despite sedentary nonworkmg lifestyle
usinf objective standard of average worker in
nonemplovment life); Couture \ Mammoth
Groceries ' Inc., 116 N.H 181. 355 K2d 421
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting bean problems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting
beef medicali> caused the fatal bean attack)
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back injuries arising frorr, ordinan duties
upon proof of mecbcal causal connection,
between workplace exertions and the iniu
ryy. Residential and Commercial Cov
struction Co i. Industrial Commission
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting n
the ordinary course of work compensable)
Power* x Industrial Commissioii 19
Utah 2d 140. 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967)
(awarding compensation to fireman for ex
ertions in the normal course of employment—the Court rejecting tne unusual ex
ertion test in favor of ordinan exertion;
Baker t. Industrial Commission. 17 Utah
2d 141. 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compensable): Purity Biscuit Co r.
Industrial Commission. 115 Utah 1. 201
P.2d 961 (1949) Although the usual exertion rule was questioned in Me lien i. In
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 31b76, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of
cases Moreover, Residential and Com
mercial Construction Co.. Schmidt, and
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensator
for usual workplace activity after the Mel
lev decision Clearly, the usual exertior
rule is no: simph an aberration in Utah
la*
When read in chronological sequence,
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent
and confused approach to determining
when an accident arose out of or in the
course of employment Much of this con
fusion can be traced to fundamental proU
lems stemming from the use of the usual
unusual distinction as a means of proving
causation Larson criticizes the unusual
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure
causal connection/' Larson, supra, § 8fc81, at 7-270. The problems in determining
what activities were usual or unusual were
6.

recognized a.c long ago as 1949 when Jus
tice Wolf(j wrou tnat a "Pandora's box of
difficulties . . may be opened by the re
fmements between usual ana unusual. e>.
ertion ana overexertion, ordinary and e>
traordman exertion measured by the individual mvoivea or by the inaustna) function periormed by hmi or both '
Punti
Biscuit. 115 Utah at 23. 201 P.2d at 97^
(Wolfe, J- concurring speciallyj Tne coir
tents of the Pandoras box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora
of our cases struggling with a defmiuon of
a compensable accident based upon the
usualness or ordinariness of an activity.
Professor Larson has also criticized the
usual-unusual distinction because the ord>
nanness of the activity fails to consider
that some occupations routinely require a
usual exertion capable of causing injury.
Likewise, other occupations, such as desk*
work, require BO little physical effort that
an "unusual exertion* may be insufficient
to prove that the resulung accident arose
out of the employment Larson, supra,
§ 38.81, at 7-270 f '
15] Because we find the present use of
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take
this opportunity to examine an alternative
causation analysis that may better meet
the objectives of the workers compensation laws We are mindful that the key
question in determining causation is whether, given this body and this exeruon. the
exertion in fact contributed to. the injury.
Id § 38.82. at 7-271;- Purity biscuit 115
Utah at 23. 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe. J.,
concurring specially).
(6) The language "arising out of or in
the course of his employment" found in
U.C.A.. 1953. { 85-1-45 '(Supp.1986), was
apparently intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is a
usually required by the job is so great that ii
would break the strongest man even he will
not be able lo recover But if it is more lhar.
usual exeruor, which causes the injury the
employee can recover no matter how Ughi the
work is which causes the injury

Larson s observation is consistent with this

Court k rationale for rejecting the unusual exer
tion requirement in Purity Bisctui, 115 Utah a;
16. 20] P.2d at 968

|I)f (overexertion) is the test no one will ever
know what thjs court will consider sufticien'.
overexertion Also under thai test if the work

ADDENDUM C-12

id

ALLEN v INDl' STR1AI COM\
Cut u. 72S fJLd 15 (tn»l

usinf an objective standard the case lav
will eventually define a standard for typical
''nonemployment activity" in much the wa;.
case law has developed the standard of
care for the reasonable man in tort lav.
f 10] 2 Medico! Cause—Tt* seconc
part of Larson s dual-causation test re
quires that the claimant prove the disability
is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related
activity Tne purpose of the medical cause
test is to ensure that there is a medicaliy
demonstrable causal link between the
work-related exertions and the unexpected
injuries that resulted from those strains
The medica) causa! requirement will pre
vent an employer from becoming a genera!
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims
With the issue being one primarily of
causation, the importance of the . . .
medical panel becomes manifest. It is
through the expertise of the medical parel that the Commission should be able tc
make the determination of whether tin
injury sustained by a claimant K causal)}
connected or contributed to by the claim
ant's employment
Schmidt. 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins. J., concurring) Under tne medical cause test, the
claimant must show by evidence, opinion.
or otherwise that tne stress, strain, or exer
tion required by his or her occupation led u
the resulting injury or disability In tm
event the claimant cannot show * medica1
causal connection, compensation should be
denied/
III
111] We now undertake to apply the
foregoing analysis to the case before us
In reviewing findings of fact of the Indus
trial Commission, we determine whether
there is substantia) evidence to support the
Commissions findings Champion Home
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness o'
the employee s exertions may be relevant to the
medica) conclusion of causa) connection
Where the injury results from latent symptoms
with an illness such as bean disease, proof of
medical causation may be especially difficult
Larson s treatise cites many examples of cases

lltar
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buildcn ? Industnn1 Commission 7(K
P.2d 30(i. 307 (l tab 1985
112] We nave previously stated that th<
key element of whetner an injury occurred
"oy accident' is whether the injury wai
unexpectec After reviewing the recorc
we find no substantial eviaence that th<
injury was not unexpected It is c)ea~
from the uncontradicted testimony of the
claimant that he expenencea an unexpectec
and unanticipated injury to his back as he
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of
the cooler. Although the claimant had in
jured his back on prior jobs, he had not
complained of pain or limitations at his job
with Kent's Foodx Tnere is no evidence
which indicates that this injury was predictable or that it developed gradually as with
an occupational disease or progressive back
disorder. While the employer s report of
injury and the medical records do not corroborate that a sudden and identifiable injury occurred in the cooler, the reports are
unhelpful in determining whether the injury was unexpectec
It appears that the administrative lav
judge applied the ''unusual event or trauma' rule in defining an accident We have
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on
unexpecteaness
Moreover, the administrative law judge s emphasis on pnor injuries is not determinative of whether an
accident occurred We have previously
held that the aggravation or "lighting up'
of a preexisting condition by an internal
failure is a compensable accident Powers
t. Industrial Commi&sxoiu., 19 Utah 2d 140,
143. 427 P.2d 740. 743 (19C7) We conclude
therefore tnat the decision of the Commission that the claimants injury was not "by
accident' was not based on trie evidence,
and thai decision is. therefore erroneous
113] Tne key issue in this case, like
most interna) failure cases, is whether the
injury "arose out of or in the course of
where compensation claim* were defeated bt
cause of inadequate proof of medica) causauor.
See Larson, suprc, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321
Compare Guidr\ v. Slme Indus Painters, inc.,
418 So^d 626 (La 1982) (heart attack triggered
by stresy exertion and strain greater than sec
eniary life of averagt worker compensable;.
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employment " Since the claimant had pre
vious back problems, to meet the legal cab
sauon requirement ne must show thai mo\
ing and lifting several piies of dairy proo
ucts weighing thiny to fifty pounas in tn*
confmea area of tnt cooler exceeded tnexertion tnat tne average person typicali>
undertakes in nonempioyment life The e^
idence presented by tne claimant was msuf
ficient for us to make a determination regarding legal causauon It is unclear from
the record how many crates were moved by
the claimant, the distance the crates were
moved, the precise freight of the crates,
and the size of the area m which the lifung
and moving took place Because the claim
ant did not have the benefit of the fore
going opinion, we remand for further fact
finding on this issut
Moreover, the record is insufficient to
show medical causauon It is unclear from
the medical reports whether the doctors
were aware of tne specific incident in the
cooler Further, the case was not submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation
Without sufficient evidence of medical cau
aauon. we are unable to determine whether
there is a medically demonstrable causal
link between the lift in the cooier and the
injury to the claimant's back We there
fore remand to the Industrial Commission
for addiuonai evidence and findmgb on the
question of medical causation
Tne decision of the Commission is vacated and remanded
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN. JJ., concur
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur in remanding this case to the
Commission for the purpose of determining
1. Powers v. Industrial Commn. 19 Utah 2d 140,
M>-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967).
2. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).
3. Emery Mining Corp \. DeFnez 694 P.2d tOt
(Utah 1984;, Giles v. Indusmal Commn, 692
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984). fnto-Lay. Inc. v. Jacobs,
680 p.2d 1335 (Utah 1984;. Billings Computer
Corp i Jarango. 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1963;
Sabos Elec Sen v Sabc 642 V26 722 (Utah
1982;, Kaiser Steel x. Monfred:. 631 P.2d S8f
(Utah 1981;; Farmer's Gram Cooperative v. Mo
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whether tne work incident aggravated a
preexisting condition such as would war
rant an award of compensation .' However
1 bo not join the Court in adopting ar,
* unexpectea result"" standard to be applied
in determining tne existence of a compensa
b)e acciaen:
1 do not beheve that this Court has ^misconstrued the historical and logical" definition of "by accident' in the bulk of iu
recent cases concerning the issue at bar.
Tne majority's reliance upon Purity Biscuit Co t. Industrial Commission2 is
misplaced The holding therein is without
precedential value because it has been simpiy ignored 3 Tne only case in which this
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt
v. Industrial Commission.4 which support
is similarly without precedential value be
cause it has also been ignored beginning
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler} the very
next accident case handed down. In that
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission 4 and again
defined "accident* as an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events In my view. Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our postwar case law.
Tne majority opinion holds that henceforth an injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may
be either the cause or the re*nh of an
injury." (Emphasis urorigmal.) However,
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to
establish policy, has chosen wording which
precludes such an interpretation. The rea
sonmg of Justice Latimer's dissent in Purison 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980) Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-L)c\ Samis v. Industrial Comm n.
590 P^d 328 (Utah 1979;, Redman Uarehouswf
Corp. v. Industrial Commn. 22 Utah 2d 39fc. 454
?26 283 (1969; Carkng v. Industrial Commn,
16 Ulah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965;.
4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980;
5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980,
6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965)

C-14

ALLEN v 1\D ATRIAL CO^TN

Itar

2<<

Cite at W F J ) 19 ( U a h 191*

STEWART, Justice: (dissenting*
I dissent Tne majority defines the statutory term "accident* to mear "unexpected result." regardless of whether it is
produced by a usual or an unusual event.
The majority also defines the term "arising
out of or in the course of employment1 to

impose iega) and medical causation reouirtrnenu Sec U.C.A.. 1953, $ 3?-1-4:
Curiously, tne requirement of "legal cat
satior" has two difierent meanings depending upon the physical condition of tm
worker at tne time he is mjurec A wonte*
havinp no preexisting medical condition or
handicap need only prove that trie acciden*
was caused tn a "usual or ordinary exe*tior. " But for congenital!} handicappec
persons and for persons who have suffered
preexisting industrial injuries (which presumably have left the worker with some
physical weakness or deterioration), legal
causation has a different meaning Such a
worker may receive compensation only if
the "employment contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater than that of
nonemployment life " According to the
majority, such a worker must now prove
that his internal breakdown was caused by
"aw unusual or extraordinary exertion "
in order to establish the requisite legal
causation, even though the majority opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-unusual distinction as a means of proving
causation " How the majority can reject
that standard for persons having no preev
isung condition, yet emDrace that standard
for persons witn preexisting conditions, is
baffling
Furthermore, the difference between the
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which
a worker with a preexisting condition mus:
demonstrate and the "usual exertion"
which a person witn no preexisting condr
tion must demonstrate is far from-clear
The latter standard Is lo be judged with
respect to the " normal nonemployment
life of this or any other person" Tne
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating
exertion must be compared with the usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonem
pioyment life, not the nonemployment life
of the particular worker " What the term
"usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment" means is not defmed by the

7. Act of Jan 27, 1984, ch. 75. § 1. 1984 Utah
Laws 610, 610

9. Act of March IS, 1917. ch 100, f 52a. 1917
Utah Laws 306. 322-23

S. U.CA.. 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol 4B, 1974
ed., Supp.1986).

10. 16 Utah 2d 26C. 399 ?26 202 (1965)

tv Biscuit illustrate? the shortcomings of
the majority s interpretatior. Tne wore
"accident/' when viewed in »olaiion. mabe used to denote both an unexpected occurrence which produces injury as weh as
an unexpected injun Tne word "injun
on the other hand, denotes a result ano no:
a cause. Had the legislature only used tn<
word "injury* in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A..
1953, $ 3^1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B. 1974 ec.
Supp.1986)). then that statute woulo cover
all results regardless of the cause Had
the legislature only used the word "acc>
dent," then 1 would agree with the majority's holding today that the legislature intended to cover both the cause and the
result In fact however, the legislature
has used both words "injury" and "accident" It follows that the word "accident"
must be interpreted as focusing upon the
cause and not the result In short, the
majority's interpretation writes the word
"injun-* out of the statute. Such a decision is unwarranted in my viev,
Tne legislature recently amended sectior.
35-1-45.7 but chose to leave intact the stardard which limits the payment of compel;
sation to those injured "Dy accident arising
out of or in the course of ... employ*
men: " f Moreover, the singular "injury by
accident' standard has not been altered or
amended since its inception in 1917* Tne
legislature thus being satisfied with the
Court h interpretation of tne tern "accident" in trie long line of cases beginning
with Cariinp t Industrial Commission"
I decline to embark upon a new effort to
redefine that tern*
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majorin
Th( fev examples se; ou: o<
little to explain the concept aimed at. othe^
tnan to suggest that tne term means som*thing more tnari simp!*., hfe-sustaining a'
tiviuer
1 wholly fail to understand why persons
wTho have a preexisting condition should t*
placed in the disadvantaged position, u
deed the near-remediiess position, that tin
majority opinion imposes upon them Tnt
purpose of the Second Injun Fund is U>
provide compensation for workers who
have preexisting medical conditions and
therefore run a greater risk of injury wher
they expose themselves to the hazards of
the work place But the law should encourage such persons to work rather than
encouraging them to abandon the work
force for some kind of unearned support
This Court has repeatedly stated that the
Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage employers to hire persons with
preexisting conditions by spreading the
risk throughout the industry to assure such
persons that their injuries will be cared for
without imposing extraordinary liabilities
on the employer* who hire them Inter,
mountain Smelting Corp. i. Capttanc.
610 P.2d 334. 337 (litah 1980) McPkxc r
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 50;
505 (Utah 1976) Soaety certainly ought u
favor those policies which encourage pecpie to work, rather than policies that deter
employers from offering gainful employ
ment to those who have a higner risk of
work-related iniun Tnere is litue person
a) or aocial benefit from & policy that tend*
to discourage persons from working be
cause of pnor injuries or disabilities
Further, it is fundamental!) unfair and
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes
of the workmen s compensation laws to
impose higher standards for compensation
on those with preexisting medical conditions than on those without Tort law gen
erally does not do so. A defendant in a
negligence action is required to take the
victim as the defendant finds him: whatever unusual vulnerabilities the victim may
have art disregarded. That principle
should not be, and until now has not beer*.
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different m workmen s compensation law
whicr, is really a substitute for ton lav
remedies in short, handicapped or prev>
ousiy injured persons who are injured by
an industrial accident are simply discriminated against by having to meet the majon
ty s rigorous legal cause requirement
1 am also unable to understand how an
administrative law judge the Industrial
Commission, or an appellate court is supposed to determine what "typical nonemployment activities* are "in today's socie
ty.' as they now must do for the purpose
of determining legal causation for workers
with preexisting medical conditions. Does
that mean what a typical sixty-f ive-year-old
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does
during his or her nonemployment activities'/ Is it what a professional football
player does in his leisure time or what a
ballet dancer does 0 Is it what a sedentary
worker does in his or her off-hours or what
a forest ranger does'
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the majority provides examples which
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated
principle Tne examples "include taking
fuli garbage cans to the street, lifting and
carrying baggage for travel, changing a
fiat tire on an automobile, lifting a small
child to chest height, and climbing the
stairs in buildings ' These few examples,
which I find to be arguable in any event
since they reflect only wnat aome people
may do from time to firm:, do not substitute
for a legal standard 1 seriously wonder
whether changing a flat tire on an automtbile is a typical activity w today's soaety.
and ] do not know how much luggage the
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or
she carries it Tne point is that the major)
ty- has not set forth a workable standard at
all. In fact. I have serious doubt that such
an artificial construct as "typical nonem
ployment activities*' will produce more fair
and rational decisions than our past cases.
The majority simply assumes a "typical"
individual for the purpose of establishing a
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people, not to "average"
people, and the law has always recognized
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as much In short. I do not think that tm
majority s newly established standard wil
produce decisions one whit more consistent
or rational than those produced in Un
past 1
The majority also holds that an injured
person must prove that the disability is
''medically the result of an exertion or inju
ry that occurred during a work-related ac
tivity " With a degree of hope that 1 think
is unwarranted, the majority states tha:
M
[t)he medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims." 1 am fearful that that
hope is seriously misplaced
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the
source of the Court's new standards and
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of
law. but there is much to be said for the
case-by-case approach in hammering out
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion
produce inconsistencies 1 readily concede
that present law needs to be rationalized
and that some cases should be overruled
because they are hopelessly inconsistent
witn other cases, but 1 do not believe thai
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a
manner as to defeat those humane policies
intended to allow for the injuries of workers who come to the work place in an
impaired condition
1 also join the Chief Justices dissent
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Richard E HOLLOWAY. PiaintifT.
v
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH. Richard E Hollo
way Trucking [Employer], and the
Bute Insurance Fund [Insurance earner for the Employer], Defendant*.
No. 20621.
Supreme Court of Utah
Nov. 21, 198C
Virginius Dabney. Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff
Dsvid L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R.
Black. Man- A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City,
for defendants
STEWART, Justice
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a selfemployed truck driver. On July 11. 19&4.
after driving for about six hours, he
stopped at a rest stop He claims that he
slipped while walking across an oil spili or,
his way to the restroom and that the sbj
caused him to jerk to regain his balance After returning from the restroom, Holloway
bent over to inspect one of his truck tares
While crouching, he experienced an immediate sharp pain in his back which made
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms
and jaw His wife, also a truck driver,
drove for the rest of the trip Two days
after the incident Holioway consulted a chiropractor in Georpa "He consulted another chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake
City. Tne slip on tne oil spill was not
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors
who examined Holiowsy. in the First Report of Injury, or in the claimants report
of how the injun- occurred.
The Commission denied review of the
administrative law judge's order. The
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injun* was
not the result of an "accident" as that term

1. In my view, the decisions of this Court arc
general h reconcilable with only a feu glaring
exceptions and most of them prior to 19SC
That there axe more inconsistencies the further
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back one foes in our body of law is not particu
lariv unexpected. In any event. I doubt that the
new approach wil) produce unwavering consist
ency over the years
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ADDENDUM "D"

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 86000857

LESTER WAYNE SMITH,
Applicantf
vs.
SISCO HILTE and/or
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 4,
1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m..
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicant was present and represented by Sherlynn W.
Fenstermaker, Attorney at Law.
Defendants were
Attorney at Law.

represented

by

Henry K. Chai, II,

^Second Injury Fund was joined at the time of the
proceedings and was not represented at the hearing.

The issues to be addressed in this matter are as follows:
1.

Whether the applicant sustained injuries as a result
of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986.

2.

Causal relationship
accident.

3.

Temporary total disability compensation from March 25,
1986 to November 24, 1986.

4.

Permanent partial impairment and apportionment of said
impairment with defendant, Second Injury Fund.

of the injuries to the alleged
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5.

Medical expenses including those for surgery on May 28,
1986.

Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the medical issues were
submitted to a special panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge. The
Medical Panel Report was received and circulated to the parties.
No
objections were submitted to the Medical Panel Report. However, counsel for
the defendant did submit legal memorandum regarding the issue of compensable
accident.
Counsel for the applicant responded on June 5, 1987. After
reviewing the Medical Panel Report and the Memorandums submitted in this
matter, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to make a Findings of Fact
and enter an Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, is a 40-year-old
male, who, at the time of his industrial injury, was married and had four
dependent children under the age of eighteen. At the time of his injury, the
applicant was earning $7.63 an hour, working forty hours per week. The
applicant began his employment with the defendants in November of 1985. His
duties consisted of running a grinder and some general maintenance work. It
was the defendants* business to clean steel molds and plate the molds with
enforcing steel.
On March 25, 1986, around 2:00 p.m., the applicant was running his
grinder. His supervisor asked him to move some steel plating, which was used
to reinforce the molds. The steel plates were generally banded together and
varied in width and length from 8 feet to 12 feet by 14 inches. Most of the
plates were anywhere from 1/4 inch thick to 3/8 inch thick. The individual
plates would weigh between 50 to 80 pounds, depending on the size. To move
the plates, they had to be unhanded and moved individually. The applicant had
moved two or three plates in this manner. On the next plate, he bent over,
placing one hand on top of the plate and one hand underneath and began to
raise it. When he had it approximately a foot and a half from the top of the
stack, or at approximately his waist level, the applicant felt a sharp snap in
his low back just above the waistline. He had an immediate radiation of sharp
pains into his right leg. There was some question about the size of the plate
the applicant was moving. He initially estimated it to be 12 feet by 14
inches and to weigh approximately 80 pounds. However, the initial doctor's
report shortly after the incident, indicates that the plate weighed
approximately 50 pounds. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge adopts that
weight as the most probable weight. The applicant's pain was so sharp that he
had to set the plate down, and he reported the incident to his supervisor.
His supervisor had the applicant stay in the office for the remainder of the
two hours of the shift doing light work. By the time he left for home, his
pain had increased greatly and he developed a burning sensation in his right
leg.
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Because his condition had not improved the next morning, the
applicant made an appointment with the chiropractor, Dr. Hansen. He received
the proper industrial papers from his employer and submitted them to Dr.
Hansen. X-rays were then taken. He commenced a course of manipulations and
heat treatment and was directed to stay off work. The applicant was treated
by the chiropractor for seven weeks. Because his condition had not improved
at the end of the seven week period, Dr. Hansen referred him to Dr. Alan
Hunstock, a neurosurgeon.
The applicant first saw Dr. Hunstock in May of 1986. Dr. Hunstock
directed him to Utah Valley Hospital for x-rays and a CT scan. After those
tests had been completed, surgery was recommended. The surgery was performed
on May 28, 1986, at Utah Valley Hospital. After his release, the applicant
continued his follow-up care with Dr. Hunstock.
The surgery was very
successful in eliminating the applicant's right leg pain. He has had one or
two small recurrences since the surgery, but they have been minor and have
gone away quickly. He still has some backaches on a fairly regular basis,
particularly in the morning. The only medication that he takes for pain is
aspirin. The applicant was released to return to work on November 24, 1986.
He was released with some restrictions regarding lifting and sitting.
The applicant received a total of $1,750.10, in temporary total
disability compensation which was paid from May 14, 1986 through June 5,
1986. He was paid at the rate of $214.89 per week.
The applicant has had several prior injuries. In 1978, while working
for Tichner Ford, the applicant had an injury to his left knee. He was
treated for that injury by Dr. Mendenhall.
Although the incident was
industrial, his benefits were denied because the applicant failed to report
the incident to his employer. The applicant also sustained injuries to the
little finger on his left hand in 1981, when it was cut on a steel plate. The
tip was initially cut off and was sewn back on. The applicant has good use of
the finger and was paid compensation for that injury.
Although the applicant denies having had priDr back injuries or
problems, the records of Dr. Mendenhall indicate that he did treat the
applicant for some low back pain in March of 1980, and again in Hovember of
1980. The treatment was primarily conservative but did include the use of a
TENS unit and also some hospitalization.
The records indicate that the
incident occurred when the applicant bent over the fender of an automobile.
The applicant has also had an injury to his head in February of 1984,
while working in Park City. A nail gun, weighing approximately five pounds,
fell and knocked him unconscious. At that time, he received treatment from
Dr. Meyer. An MMPI test was given to the applicant following that injury.
Dr. Meyer apparently diagnosed him as having a conversion disorder.
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The medical panel assigned in this matter found that the applicant
had an overall impairment of 12X of the whole person. Of that amount, 2% was
assigned to his injury to his knee in February of 1978. The remaining 10% was
attributed to the applicant's low back problems with 3/10 being attributed to
the injuries in March of 1980, and 7/10 being attributed to the industrial
accident in March of 1986. It was the panel's opinion that there was a
medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's low back
problems and the industrial accident of March 25, 1986, and that the industrial
injury did medically aggravate a pre-existing impaired condition of the
applicant.
It was also the panel's opinion that the surgery which was
performed on May 28, 1986, was necessary for the applicant to recover from the
aggravation of the pre-existing condition. The panel found that the applicant
was temporarily and totally disabled from March 25, 1986 until the date of
November 24, 1986, when he was released by his treating physician. No
objections having been received, the Administrative Law Judge will adopt the
findings of the medical panel as her own.
The defendants have submitted a Memorandum indicating that the
applicant has not met the burden of legal causation as announced in the Allen
vs. Industrial Commission decision. Counsel for the defendants has argued
that the panel pointed out that the applicant's back problem could have been
triggered by lifting much less than a fifty pound weight and that the fifty
pound weight is similar to some of the everyday activities as discussed by the
Court in the Allen decision. However, the Administrative Law Judge is not
inclined to construe the Allen decision in the same light as the defendants.
It should be pointed out the facts in this matter are not substantially
different from those in the Giles case where the applicant had a substantial
pre-existing condition, but his actual injury was triggered by unusual
exertion. In that case, it was clear that the applicant's eye problem could
have been triggered by something considerably less than the exertion made.
However, the Court upheld the findings of a compensable accident in that
case. The Administrative Law Judge feels that this is a similar situation.
The lifting of an awkward steel plate which weighs approximately fifty pounds
from a level which is approximately between the applicant's waist and knees
seems to the Administrative Law Judge a somewhat unusual- exertion, particularly
when it is viewed in light of the fact that the applicant had lifted several
other steel plates in a similar manner just immediately preceding the
occurrence.
An adoption of the medical panel findings would indicate that the
applicant is entitled to temporary total disability compensation at the rate
of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25- Of this amount,
the defendants have already paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a remainder due
and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15. Additionally, the defendants would
be liable for a 7% permanent partial impairment of the whole person or 21.84
weeks at the rate of $215.00 per week for a total of $4,695.60. The
defendant. Second Injury Fund, would be liable for a 3% permanent partial
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impairment or 9.36 weeks at the rate of $215.00 per week for a total of
$2,012.40. An attorneys fee will be awarded in this matter based on the
temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial impairment
compensation minus the amounts of temporary total disability compensation
already paid to the applicant. This would result in an attorney*s fee of
$2,588.03. The defendant insurance carrier in this matter shall be entitled
to reimbursement from the defendant, Second Injury Fund, for 30% of all
temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses paid in this
matter.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, sustained injuries
as a result of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986, and is
entitled to benefits in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, SISC0 Hilte and/or
Zurich American Insurance, pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith, compensation
at the rate of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25. Of
this amount, the defendants have paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a
remainder due and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15, to be paid in a lump
sum minus the attorney's fees to be awarded hereinafter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, SISC0 Hilte and/or Zurich
American Insurance, pay the applicant compensation at the rate of $215.00 per
week for 21.84 weeks or a total of $4,695.60, as compensation for a 7%
permanent partial impairment resulting from injuries sustained in his
industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is accrued and to be paid
in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of the industrial injury, said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay Sherlynn W.
Fenstermaker, attorney for the applicant, the sum of $2,588.03, as attorney's
fees, said amount to be deducted from the accrued aforesaid award of the
applicant.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith,
compensation at the rate of $2,012.40, as compensation for a 3% permanent
partial
impairment
resulting
from pre-existing
conditions which were
aggravated by the industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is
accrued and to be paid in 8 lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Zurich American Insurance,
shall be entitled to reimbursement for 30% of all temporary total disability
compensation and medical expenses upon the submission of a verified petition
to the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund indicating the amounts so
expended.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Janet Li
nistrative Laii
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
30^
day of July, 1987.
ATTEST:
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 1
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No:

LESTER WAYNE SMITH,

86000857

*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.

*

ORDER DENYING

*

SISCO HILTE and/or
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,

*
*
*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On July 30, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the
applicant in the above-captioned case temporary total compensation, permanent
partial impairment benefits and medical expenses related to a March 25, 1986
back injury. Prior to the issuance of the Order, counsel for the defendant
filed a Memorandum on the issue of legal causation.
In that Memorandum,
counsel for the defendant argues that the March 25, 1986 back injury is not
compensable, because the applicant cannot establish legal causation, one of
the elements of compensability per the Supreme Court case Allen v. the
Industrial Commission, 729 P,2d 15 (Utah 1986).
As the applicant had a
previous back condition prior to the March 1986 lifting incident, counsel for
the defendant maintains the applicant must be able to show that the injury
occurred pursuant to unusual exertion in order to establish legal causation.
Counsel for the defendant finds that the lifting of a 50 pound steel plate is
not unusual exertion as it is similar to a list of activities the Court in
Allen found require only normal or usual exertion. Counsel for the applicant
responded to the defendant's pre-hearing Memorandum stating that the weight
and manner of lifting involved in the March 25, 1986 .incident clearly takes
the activity out of the usual exertion category.
On October 2, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the
defendant filed a Motion for Review of the Administrative Law Judge's July 30,
1987 Order.
Renewing the arguments earlier made in his pre-hearing
Memorandum, counsel for the defendant argues that the Administrative Law Judge
should not have awarded benefits, as the applicant failed to establish the
legal causation element necessary for a finding of compensability. In the
Memorandum supporting the Motion for Review, counsel for the defendant notes
that the Industrial Commission has adopted a 20 pound standard for determining
what lifting injuries will be considered unusually exertive. Counsel for the
defendant maintains that use of this standard by the Administrative Law Judge
is error as the Allen case list of activities requiring only normal exertion
includes lifting activities that could involve items like the 50 pound plate
lifted by the applicant. Specifically, counsel for the defendant notes that
garbage cans and tires often weigh more than 20 pounds. Counsel for the
applicant responds to this argument in a October 19, 198 7 Response to the
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Motion for Review. She states that the manner in which the applicant lifted
the 50 pound plate has to be considered in determining the level of exertion
involved in the March 25, 1986 incident. She notes that the applicant wasn*t
lifting with two hands as would be done in the Allen list of lifting
activities, but rather with one hand only.
The sole issue to be determined by the Commission on review is
Whether or not the applicant was injured pursuant to unusual exertion on March
25, 1986, thereby establishing the legal causation element of compensability.
The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge
with respect to the manner and weight involved in the March 25, 1986 lifting
incident. Based on the Administrative Law Judge's findings, the Commission
finds the lifting incident at issue involved unusual exertion. The Commission
does not believe a typical non-employment activity of men and women in the
latter part of the twentieth century includes lifting 50 pounds.
It is
conceivable that a tire or garbage can may weigh 50 pounds, but the Commission
believes they typically weigh less than that. The Commission has adopted no
absolute 20 pound standard to use in determining which lifting incidents will
be considered unusually exertive. The 20 pound "standard" comes from a foot
note in the Allen case where the Court quotes with approval Professor Larson
Who states the "usual wear and tear of life - which certainly includes lifting
objects weighing 20 pounds."
The Commission finds each case must be
determined based on its own facts and the Commission has been consistent in
finding weight alone should not be the only consideration. In the instant
case, the necessity of lifting comparatively heavy and awkward steel plates
was a risk to the applicant caused by his employment that goes beyond what
typically is required in non-employment life in general. Therefore, per
Allen, liability for the injury caused by that risk is properly placed on the
employer.
Therefore, the Commission must affirm the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that the March 25, 1986 accident meets the legal causation
test and as result is compensable.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's October 2, 1987 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's July 30, 1987 Order is
hereby affinned and final with further appeal to the _Court of Appeals only
within the thirty (30) day time limit and as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83.
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Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake^City, Utah, this

7&+ „ day of / / ^ ^ r ^ ^

Lenice L. Nielsen
Commissioner

1987,

ATTESJ^
Jrf>iri Florez
ammissioner

^fcinda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

Brief

of

Defendants/Respondents'

postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Henry K. Chai II
Larry R. Laycock
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Industrial Commission of Utah
P. 0. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
DATED AND SIGNED this 3^

day of June,, 1988.

first class,

